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Abstract 
While in theory decoupled payments do not distort production decisions, in practice there are several 
potential coupling mechanisms for these payments. We use farm-level data from Kansas to revisit the 
issue of how (de)coupled are these supposedly “decoupled” payments by focusing on how they may 
impact production through credit constraints. In particular, we study how production effects may have 
differed across farmers with varying levels of debt pressure. Our empirical approach exploits the fact that 
we can observe the same farm over time (and so can account for the effects of time-constant omitted 
variables) to study how these payments affected total crop acres, owned acres, and the decisions to plant 
corn, sorghum, soybeans and wheat. Like previous studies, we find small production effects. Nonetheless 
our results suggest decoupled payments have potentially distortionary effects on production. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the late nineteen nineties, the rising costs associated with income support programs and the 
commitments to limit trade-distorting subsidies motivated a more market-oriented approach to 
agricultural policy from the United States. On April 4 of 1996, after the longest farm bill debate 
in history, the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996, also known as 
Freedom  to  Farm,  became  law,  putting  an  end  to  the  United  States’  agricultural  policy 
orientation established during the “New Deal” era.  
A major change in commodity programs was included in the FAIR Act’s Title I, known 
as  the  Agricultural  Market  Transition  Act  (AMTA), which  replaced the  old system  of price 
supports  with  Production  Flexibility  Contracts  (PFC)  –  predetermined  annual  payments  for 
“contract commodities” given to eligible landowners and producers with eligible cropland – to 
be gradually phased-out during the transition to the next Farm Bill. This effectively decoupled 
the payments from current market conditions, as payments were based on historical (base) acres 
and  yields  and  were  not  tied  to  current  production,  prices,  or  resource  use.  Authorized  by 
emergency  legislation  in  1998-2001, ad  hoc  Market  Loss  Assistance (MLA)  payments  were 
made to recipients of PFC payments to compensate them for the loss of markets, effectively 
doubling the amount of payments given to landowners or producers for the years 1998-1999. 
While also decoupled, these payments were, however, tied to market prices in that they were a 
result  of poor market  conditions.  Despite  the  fact that  the  FAIR  Act  decoupled  government 
payments, the extent to which it actually changed U.S. farm policy continues to be debated, a 
debate which is fostered by the amount of ad hoc support and continuation of AMTA (PFC and 
MLA) payments in the 2002 Farm Bill, as well as the base and yield updates it allowed. In 
particular, this payment extension raises the classic issues of time consistency and credibility of 4 
government policy  considered by  Kydland and Prescott (1977), as farmers may increase the 
current acreage in anticipation of further base revisions.  
The question of whether decoupled payments affect crop production is important for at 
least three reasons (Adams et al. 2001). First, if the payments increase crop production, and 
therefore decrease prices and returns, they fall short of meeting one of their main goals, which is 
to increase farm household income. Second, there may be environmental consequences if the 
payments  affect  crop  production  decisions.  Finally,  because  agricultural  policies  have  non 
negligible international spillovers, a causal relationship between decoupled payments and crop 
production  would  undermine  the  economic  rationale  of  the  WTO’s  green  box  category  of 
domestic support.
1   
Our  first  goal  is  to  revisit  the  impact  of  decoupled  payments  on  farmers’  acreage 
decisions in the presence of credit constraints. The existence of credit constraints may thwart the 
decoupled nature of the payments, in that they may be used to replace or complement outside 
credit  in  undertaking  investment  projects.  To  see  the  link  between  credit  constraints  and 
investment decisions, consider the following line of reasoning. Credit markets are characterized 
by information asymmetries, and agricultural subsidies may provide an additional guarantee to 
lenders that loans will be repaid in the end of the lending period. This increases the liquidity of a 
credit-constrained farmer, thereby allowing investment to take place. We assume that farmers 
with better credit-worthiness are less credit-constrained, as they can provide better collateral in 
case they default on the loan. In addition, empirical studies suggest that decoupled payments are 
capitalized into land values, improving the credit-worthiness of farmers when they own land.  
                                                 
1 In WTO terminology, subsidies in general are identified by “boxes” which are given the colors of traffic lights: 
green (permitted), amber (to be reduced), red (forbidden); the Agriculture Agreement has no red box, although 
domestic support exceeding the reduction commitment levels in the amber box is prohibited.  The green box is 
defined in Annex 2 of the Agriculture Agreement.  In order to qualify, green box subsidies must not distort trade, or 
at most cause minimal distortion, they have to be government-funded, and must not involve price support. 5 
Our  second  goal  is  to  observe  whether  the  magnitude  of  the  impact  of  decoupled 
payments depends on the degree to which farmers are credit-constrained. Our hypothesis is that 
farmers who are more  credit-constrained will exhibit greater acreage responses to decoupled 
payments. The intuition underlying this hypothesis is that farmers who exhibit greater credit-
worthiness  should,  in  principle,  have  easier  access  to  outside  funds  to  implement  their 
investment plans and more flexibility to react to short-term price shocks. Government payments 
should play a lesser role in investment decisions for these farmers. All else constant, the acreage 
effects of decoupled payments should be greater the more credit-constrained the farmers.  
Our  approach  resembles  Goodwin  and  Mishra  (2006)  while  improving  on  its  major 
shortcoming: the lack of observations on individual farms over time. We use farm-level records 
from the Kansas Farm Management Association (KFMA) for 1996 through 2001, the period 
during  which  the  FAIR  Act  was  in  place.  While  previous  studies  on  the  effects  of  AMTA 
payments on farmers’ acreage decisions have employed farm-level data, those data have come 
mainly from USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS), and therefore do not 
contain  observations  on individual farms  over  time  (see,  for  example,  Goodwin  and  Mishra 
2006, and Key et al. 2004). The use of survey data, as pointed out by Goodwin and Mishra, 
makes  it  difficult  to  account  for  historical  values  of  key  variables  and  complicates  the 
identification of causal effects of policy variables. In the econometric analysis we begin with 
pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and then move on to exploit the fact that we can observe 
the same farm over time and implement a Fixed Effects (FE) estimator which allows us to purge 
time-constant omitted variables. We compare these results with those obtained from using the 
OLS estimator. 
We  proceed  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  we  review  some  possible  coupling 6 
mechanisms  of  decoupled  payments.  We  then  introduce  the  empirical  framework  and 
econometric methods used. The fourth section presents the empirical evaluation of the acreage 
effects of decoupled payments in the presence of credit constraints. The final section contains a 
summary of the analysis and offers concluding remarks. 
2.  Possible Coupling Mechanisms of Decoupled Payments 
Decoupled payments are often seen by economists as a mean of providing income support for 
farmers with minimal distortionary effects. In theory, because the connection between the level 
of support and current market conditions is assumed away, farmers are allowed to make market-
based decisions about which commodities to produce, how much to produce, and whether to 
produce at all. As such, these payments are not expected to cause distortions on production or 
trade patterns. In practice, however, decoupled payments may not be “production neutral”, and 
an extensive  body  of  literature has  identified  several conceivable  “coupling”  mechanisms  of 
decoupled payments, their relative importance difficult to disentangle. This section explores the 
possible  coupling  mechanisms  of  decoupled  payments and  further  motivates  the  presence  of 
credit constraints as one such mechanism. Indeed effects can arise through, for example, wealth 
effects and their impact on farmers’ risk aversion or labor choices, expectations about rebasing, 
farm  survival,  or  credit  constraints.  While  several  studies  have  attempted  to  measure  the 
distortionary  effects  of  decoupled payments,  the  overall  consensus  is  that  while  coupling  of 
decoupled payments is pervasive, its effects are small, with the exception of the impact on land 
values (Bhaskar and Beghin 2007). 
An extensive literature shows that in the presence of uncertainty, decoupled payments 
increase  farmers’  wealth,  potentially  reducing  risk  aversion  and  the  degree  of  risk  (see,  for 7 
example, Sandmo 1971, Young and Westcott 2000, and Serra et al. 2005, 2006). If farmers’ 
preferences  are  characterized  by  decreasing  absolute  risk  aversion  (DARA),  an  increase  in 
wealth implies a reduction in the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, causing them to undertake 
riskier projects, such as planting riskier crops or expanding production by planting crops on land 
that would otherwise be viewed as too risky. This effect can be magnified if payments vary 
inversely with market prices, thereby reducing income variability. Hennessy (1998) classified 
these effects as wealth and insurance effects of decoupled payments; while the latter effect would 
not be expected to apply to PFC payments, they could apply to MLA payments, which explicitly 
provided assistance in offsetting the effects of market loss. The fundamental question, however, 
involves  the  extent  to  which  payments  actually  shift  the  wealth  of  farmers.  What  could  be 
considered as  a large payment  may not be so  substantial when compared  against a farmer's 
overall wealth, which tends to be quite large for the average U.S. farmer (Goodwin and Mishra 
2006,  Just  2006).  In  general,  because  the  necessary  amounts  of  transfers  to  bring  about 
significant  production  changes  in  the  presence  of  risk  aversion  is  quite  large,  this  body  of 
literature is met with skepticism.  
Labor choices are also potentially affected by decoupled payments, as the increase in 
wealth caused by the payments alters farmers’ labor-leisure choices, taking them away from 
production and into more leisurely activities. In addition, decoupled payments may influence 
labor choices through their influence on the on- and off-farm labor supply decisions. Although 
the key purpose of decoupled payments is to transfer income to farms while leaving output 
unchanged, any secondary effects on off-farm work are critical to the financial well-being of the 
farm household, since the majority of workers on U.S. farms are the operators and their families, 
who contribute at least two-thirds of the labor hours worked.  8 
Another  source  of  coupling  comes  through  expectations  about  future revisions  to the 
policy, namely expectations about rebasing. To the extent that farmers expect current production 
to determine future program benefits, their decisions may be altered by the policy, even when the 
policy is bestowed via decoupled payments. Baffes and De Gorter (2003) pointed out that as 
market conditions changed over the duration of the FAIR Act, the government’s discretion to 
change the criteria and payments made them unable to make a binding commitment over time, 
decreasing government credibility. Goodwin and Mishra (2006) observed that farmers may have 
anticipated the opportunity to update program parameters such as yield and base, and may not 
have wanted to move to nontraditional crops or to idling land because they would not want to 
lose the opportunity to secure an updated base.  
Decoupled payments also have the potential to distort markets by affecting farm business 
survival. Farms receiving high payments per acre could bid up prices of fixed resources, like 
land, causing low payment per-acre farms to shrink or exit. Payments could effectively raise a 
farm’s net worth, thereby making it less costly to obtain financing when liquidity constraints 
caused the cost of capital to depend on net worth. If large farms were liquidity constrained and 
small farms were not, an increase in payment per acre could cause large farms to expand and 
increase in number, bidding up land prices and causing small farms to shrink and decline in 
number.  Finally,  greater  payments  could  make  agriculture  more  profitable  relative  to  other 
occupations,  reducing  the  incentive  to  exit  farming.  By  influencing  farm  business  survival, 
decoupled payments can also affect farm consolidation, i.e., the number of small or family farms 
relative  to  large,  commercial  farms.  There  is  some  disagreement  in  the  literature  about  the 
direction of this effect. 
The  theoretical  foundations  of  credit  constraints  are  mainly  found  in  contemporary 9 
contract  theory,  where  informational  asymmetries  between  borrowers  and  lenders  lead  to 
unresolved problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, or costly state verification. As a result 
from the capital market imperfections that arise from these problems, external financing becomes 
more costly than internal financing.
 Farms are especially vulnerable to credit constraints because 
(a) there is a substantial lag between the purchase of inputs and the sale of outputs; (b) farms are 
highly capital intensive relative to their levels of sales and cash flow; (c) farmers’ assets are 
undiversified and inflexible – held almost exclusively in farm-specific capital, especially land; 
(d) the direct link between private wealth and farm capital limits the possibilities for providing 
collateral; (e) debt is important as a source of investment funds to a lack of well developed 
equity markets, and (f) most farms are relatively small (Blancard et al. 2006, Bierlen et al. 1998). 
As decoupled payments may increase the liquidity of credit-constrained farmers, they may lead 
to  investment  in  production  that  otherwise  would  not  occur.  Payments  may  also  provide 
additional guarantee to lenders that loans will be repaid in the end of the lending period, so that 
they may obtain more credit or under better conditions than otherwise. The impact of decoupled 
payments in the presence of credit constraints is studied by Roe et al. (2002) and Goodwin and 
Mishra (2006), who find very modest effects of decoupled payments on resource allocation and 
production. Goodwin and Mishra’s results imply that decoupled payments have only modest 
effects on acreage, a fact the authors took to be not surprising given that payments, although 
large and decoupled, represent relatively small changes in the overall wealth of the average Corn 
Belt farm (an average of 1.8 percent of the farms’ net worth). Their analysis, however, is limited 
by their reliance on ARMS data, which does not contain observations on individual farms over 
time. Using a three-sector general equilibrium model of the US economy Roe et al. observe that 
decoupled payments affect only land values and rental rates.  10 
Decoupled payments appear to have their greatest impact on land values and rental rates 
(Bhaskar  and  Beghin  2007,  Abler  and  Blandford  2007,  2005).  Because  they  are  based  on 
historical acres, decoupled payments are capitalized into the value of land and passed-through to 
landowners via higher land rents and land values, many of whom not the actual operators of the 
land.  For  example,  the  2003  Report  of  the  Commission  on  the  Application  of  Payment 
Limitations for Agriculture asserted that total government payments in recent years increased 
U.S. farmland values by 15 to 25 percent.  The report also indicated that about 41 percent of all 
farmland was rented out by landowners who did not operate the farms themselves, even though 
they might share the risk of production through crop share rental agreements.   
3.  Theoretical and Empirical Framework 
The basic contribution of our paper is to connect the influence of AMTA payments on farmers’ 
acreage decisions to their level of leverage. We study this influence controlling for unobserved 
time-invariant differences across farms and unobserved time effects. We begin this section by 
motivating the elements that should be included in the estimating equation and then proceed to 
introduce the empirical approach to estimating this equation. 
3.1.  Theoretical Model 
Suppose farmers choose planted acres to maximize their expected utility of wealth, where wealth 
is defined by initial wealth, profits derived from production, government payments, and non-
farm activities. Following Chavas and Holt (1990) the farmers’ problem can be stated as follows: 
(1) 
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where  1 − t W  is initial wealth,  jt P  is the price received for the jth crop,  () ⋅ jt Y  is the per acre output 
of the jth crop, assumed to be a function of lagged acreage ( 1 − jt A  representing rotational issues) 
and an exogenous shock  t ε ,  kt c  is the per acre cost of input k, and  t G  represents government 
payments. We now motivate the variables that should be present in the reduced-form estimating 
equation. 
Crop acres should depend on a set of factors specific to the land including, for example, 
land quality, in terms of fertility and in terms of moisture content, land accessibility, and the 
variability and type of weather pattern in the area where the farm is located. Other important 
factors should include the characteristics of the farm itself, such as the experience or skill of the 
operators, or the resources available, such as labor or equipment. 
The financial resources of the farm should also affect acreage choice. For example, when 
facing changes in opportunities for profit, the farmer may opt to add or subtract acres, by buying 
or selling or by renting in or out, or to explore already available acres in a different fashion, for 
example by changing the crop mix or the application rates of inputs such as pesticides, water and 
fertilizer. How the farmer deals with these opportunities depends largely on liquidity, both stated 
and implied. By stated liquidity we mean the actual funds the farmer has available, while by 
implied liquidity we mean how the financial channels view the default probability of the farmer 
and  thus affect  the  availability of  credit.  A  farmer  with  a higher default  probability  will  be 
viewed as a greater risk by the financial agent, and will either be denied credit or be given credit 
under less favorable conditions than a farmer with a smaller default probability.  
The motivation for our analysis is that government transfers, and decoupled payments in 
particular, may help farmers make additional investments (in acreage and/or equipment or labor), 
or take the place of higher-interest bearing loans in the sources of funds of the farm. In addition 12 
to  having  acreage  effects  per  se,  the  effects  of  these  payments  may  vary  depending  on  the 
financial status (leverage) of the farm.  Naturally, decoupled payments may also impact farmers’ 
risk aversion characteristics, labor choices, or collateral in case they own land, for example. 
Hence, the acreage equation should include variables related to the farm, to its financial 
situation, and to the amount of decoupled payments it receives. A reduced form acreage equation 
can be defined by the following set of variables: 
(2)  { } ict ict ict ict Acres GP FV Farm , , = , 
where the subscripts i, c, and t index the ith farm in county c at time t,  ict Acres  denotes crop 
acres,  ict Farm  is a vector of farm characteristics,  ict FV  is a vector of financial variables, and 
ict GP  is a vector of government payments.   
3.2.  Empirical Specification 
Following  Chavas  and  Holt  (1990)  we  include  the  farm’s  level  of  wealth  in  our  estimating 
equation as part of the farm characteristics vector. While accounting for differing risk responses 
and general wealth effects, wealth simultaneously characterizes the availability of internal funds 
versus the need to borrow capital, and provides information about the credit-worthiness of the 
farm. To capture the notion of “initial” wealth, we use the previous period’s wealth. To prevent 
double counting of payments we subtract AMTA payments receipts from total farm wealth.   
The measure of how credit-constrained is a farmer is given by the debt to asset ratio, also 
known  as  “leverage.”  Because  greater  values  of  leverage  indicate  lower  credit-worthiness, 
farmers who are more credit constrained should have smaller acreage responses to market stimuli 
and greater responses to decoupled payments. Hence we expect greater debt to asset ratios to 13 
have a negative effect on planted acres. Note, however, that as pointed out by Goodwin and 
Mishra (2006), one could potentially question the extent to which the debt to asset ratio variable 
is endogenous to production decisions. If farmers are borrowing to finance more production, all 
else  constant,  the  debt  to  asset  ratio  is  growing  with  acreage,  violating  the  exogeneity 
assumption. On the other hand, if one is willing to accept that assets may be growing due to 
intensified investment, then the growth in both the numerator and denominator could potentially 
leave the ratio unchanged. We leave this issue for future work.    
We  represent  the  degree of  decoupled  support  by  considering  the  amount  of  AMTA 
payments received by the farmers. Unfortunately, we are unable to observe this figure directly 
because the KFMA reports only the total amount of government payments the farms receive, 
which include PFC payments, MLA payments, Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) payments, 
Oilseed  payments,  Loan  Deficiency  Payments  (LDP’s),  and  Marketing  Loan  payments. 
Therefore, we estimate the amount of AMTA payments received by the farmers and use this as 
our measure of decoupled payments.
2 For the years in the sample, estimated AMTA payments 
include PFC payments and MLA payments for corn, sorghum and wheat. We should point out 
our inability to distinguish between the effects of PFC and MLA payments. Although we would 
like to observe whether unexpected decoupled payments affected acres planting decisions any 
differently than expected payments, there isn’t sufficient variation in our sample to separately 
identify the effects of unexpected payments. Because we also have hypothesized that farmers 
who are more credit constrained respond differently to decoupled payments, we allow farmers to 
exhibit  differing  responses  to  payments  according  to  their  degree  of  financial  leverage  by 
including an interaction term between the decoupled payments variable and the debt to asset 
                                                 
2 We defer the explanation of the estimation of AMTA payments to the Data section.  14 
ratio. Hence, the overall effect of decoupled payments depends on parameters involving a direct 
effect and the interaction effect with leverage.  
The estimating equation is given by: 
(3) 
ict ic ict ict
ict ict ict ict ict
u c t c t GP DAR
GP DAR Wealth Size Acres
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + = − −
η δ δ δ β
β β β β β
* * 3 2 1 5
4 3 1 2 1 1 0 , 
where  1 − ict Wealth  is initial wealth,  ict DAR  is the debt to asset ratio,  ict GP  is decoupled or AMTA 
payments (total PFC and MLA), and  1 − ict Size  measures lagged farm size (total operated acres).  
Unobserved factors that have the same influence on acres for all farms are captured by a set of 
county dummy variables c, along with year dummy variables t.
 3  These fixed effects represent, 
for example, price risk, which we assume constant across all farms in the county in a given year, 
systemic yield risk, and weather, along with other unobservable factors that may be relevant to 
production.  We  further  allow  these  unobserved  factors  to  vary  between  county  and  year  by 
introducing an interaction term between them.
4  
The error term can be decomposed into two components, the time-invariant unobserved 
factors that cause acres to vary from year to year in each county ( ic η ), and the idiosyncratic term 
( ict u ). The composite error,  ict ic u + η , draws attention to how the covariance matrix is estimated. 
The correction procedure suggested by Moulton (1986) allows each county-year group to have a 
different and unrestricted covariance structure but assumes the errors are uncorrelated across 
groups. We are thus assuming that farms within a county-year “cluster” are correlated as a result 
                                                 
3 The county dummy variables are included only in the OLS specifications. 
4 Note that unlike, for example, Chavas and Holt (1991), we do not introduce a measure of market returns (prices) in 
our estimating equation of total crop acres. There are two reasons for this. First, in the OLS equations, because 
prices are essentially the same within counties, and only vary between counties if the market price is below the pre-
defined county-level loan rate, the county dummy variables capture these effects. Second, because there is so little 
variability in prices, their effect is picked up by the yearly dummy variables in the FE estimator. 
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of the unobserved cluster effect  ic η . We further specify the Huber-White-sandwich estimator of 
variance, so that reported standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity.   
The two coefficients of interest are  4 β , the ceteris paribus marginal acreage effect of 
decoupled  government  payments,  and  5 β ,  the  impact  of  leverage  on  the  marginal  effect  of 
government payments. If government payments are not truly decoupled, we would expect to find 
a significant positive coefficient for  4 β . If government payments have greater acreage effects the 
more  leveraged  the  farms  (the  more  credit-constrained),  we  would  also  expect  to  find  a 
significant positive coefficient for  5 β .  
A fundamental assumption necessary for consistency of the OLS estimator is that there is 
no feedback from current or past shocks to current values of the regressors, or if explanatory 
variables are strictly exogenous given  ic η : 
(4)  [ ] T t u E ct ict ict ict ict ,..., 1 , 0 , , , | = = η GP FV Farm . 
We further expect much of the remaining variation in acreage decisions to be explained 
by unobserved characteristics of the farms, such as the accessibility of the farm or the skill of the 
operator. If this unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with any variable in  ict Farm ,  ict FV , or 
ict GP , equation (4) is violated and we have an endogeneity problem. To account for the possible 
correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors we specify the following 
alternative equation with a farm-specific fixed effect  i a :  
(5) 
ict ic i ict ict
ict ict ict ict ict
u a c t c t GP DAR
GP DAR Wealth Size Acres
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + = − −
η δ δ δ β
β β β β β
* * 3 2 1 5
4 3 1 2 1 1 0 ,  
and for consistency we now require:  16 
(6)  [ ] T t a u E i ct ict ict ict ict ,..., 1 , 0 , , , , | = = η GP FV Farm , 
which implies that once   ict Farm ,  ict FV ,  ict GP , and the unobserved heterogeneity are controlled 
for, the variables in  ics Farm ,  ics FV , or  ics GP , have no partial effect on  ict Acres ,  t s ≠ . The FE 
estimator allows us to purge the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity ( i a ) from the model by 
subtracting  from  each  observation  the  time-average  value  for  that  variable,  so  that  the  final 
expression is time demeaned. While this approach drops any time invariant regressors, including 
the county dummies, the county-year interaction dummy variables account for events that have 
particular effects on any given counties in any given year.   
4.  Application: KFMA farms, 1996 – 2001 (FAIR Act period) 
4.1.  Data 
Our analysis is conducted using individual farm data collected by the Kansas Farm Management 
Association (KFMA) for 1996 through 2001, the period during which the FAIR Act was in 
place, along with previous years of data for these farms to define some lagged variables in the 
analysis. Of these, between 712 and 807 farms per year grow dryland crops (an average of about 
67.48 percent). The KFMA farms are full-time commercial operations mainly representative of 
farms  with  gross  sales  exceeding  $100,000.  Of  the  61,593  farms  counted  in  the  1997 
Agricultural Census, 13,436 farms had gross sales exceeding that number (21.81 percent). The 
KFMA farms represent, according to Albright (2001), the various farming areas and farm types 
in Kansas. Our data constitute an unbalanced panel containing 6,796 observations, ranging from 
993 farms in 2001 to 1249 farms in 1996. We have information on 830 farms for the six years of 
the FAIR Act. 17 
The  KFMA  micro  data  are  supplemented  with  more  highly-aggregated  data  from  a 
variety  of  sources.  County-level  yields  come  from  USDA’s  National  Agricultural  Statistics 
Service  (NASS).  Country-level  rates  for  PFC  and  MLA  payments  (AMTA  payments),  and 
county-level Loan Deficiency Payment (LDP) rates come from unpublished USDA data. All 
nominal variables are converted to real terms by dividing by the Production Price Index for All 
Commodities published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2000=100).   
While the KFMA collects information on the total amount of government payments the 
farms receive, which include PFC payments, MLA payments, Conservation Reserve Program 
(CRP) payments, Oilseed payments, Loan Deficiency Payments (LDP’s), and Marketing Loan 
payments, only a single aggregate figure is reported. So we have to estimate the amount of 
AMTA payments received by the farms. For the years in the sample, estimated AMTA payments 
include PFC payments and MLA payments for corn, sorghum and wheat.  Recall the 1996 Farm 
bill allocated PFC payments to farms based on their payment quantity of the contract commodity 
(the product of the farm’s program payment yield for that commodity, times 85 percent of the 
contract acreage, or base acres). The annual payment rate for a contract commodity was then 
multiplied by each farm’s payment quantity for that commodity. So, PFC payments for farmer j’s 
ith  commodity  ( ijt PFC )  are  given  by  it ij ij ijt PFCrate byield bacres PFC * * * 85 . 0 = ,  where 
ij bacres  is farmer j’s contract acreage of the ith commodity,  ij byield  is farmer j’s payment yield 
of that commodity, and  it PFCrate  is the annual national payment rate for the commodity. The 
sum of these payments across contract commodities is the farm’s annual payment.  
MLA payments were made to recipients of PFC payments following the same formulae 
used to calculate PFC payments (but with different payment rates). We follow Serra et al. (2006) 
in approximating payment yields and contract acreage by the 1986-88 average yields and acres. 18 
Total estimated AMTA payments are then obtained by summing over the expected PFC and 
MLA payments. When this total exceeds the reported government payments in the KFMA data, 
the  inconsistent  estimate  is  replaced  by  total  reported  payments.  This  happens  to  about  21 
percent  of  the  observations.
5  One  limitation  of  our  data  is  that  we  cannot  monitor  whether 
farmers changed bases over time, by buying or selling land enrolled in the program, which could 
cause a change in government payments received over time other than that brought about by 
changing rates. While we recognize the problem, we assume that for each acre sold, another acre 
was bought, so that it is not clear whether such transactions led to more or less planted acres.  
Our measure of wealth  is obtained by subtracting total debts from self-assessed total 
assets. Total debts include current liabilities and current, intermediate, and long term loans, plus 
accrued  farm  expenses,  such  as  labor  hired,  interest,  machine  hire,  property  tax,  and  crop 
insurance. In order to prevent double counting of AMTA payments, we subtract AMTA payment 
receipts from our measure of wealth, as in Goodwin and Mishra (2006). The degree to which 
farms are constrained by credit is given by the debt to asset ratio, calculated by dividing total 
liabilities by total assets.   
Following a tradition set forth by Gardner, we use futures prices to calculate expected 
prices for corn, soybeans, and wheat. These are the daily average prices registered during the 
planting season for the harvest month contract, where the seasons are defined as the usual state 
planting and harvesting times found in the USDA’s 1997 publication of “Usual Planting and 
Harvesting Dates for U.S. Field Crops”. Because futures prices come from the Chicago Board of 
Trade, in Illinois, expected prices for corn, soybeans and wheat are corrected by multiplying the 
                                                 
5 Serra et al. (2006) report a statistic of 7 percent.  However, they use data from 1998 through 2001, and on a 
balanced of 596 farms. If we drop 1996 and 1997 data from our sample, this number decreases to 16 percent. This 
number further drops to 14 percent for our balanced panel of 855 farms. 19 
crop’s futures prices by a regional adjustment factor (regional basis), so that expected prices are 
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θ , i = corn, wheat, soybeans, where x is the number of previous years involved in 
the calculation. The best regional correction was judged by the squared difference between the 
actual year price reported by NASS and the estimated price based on the futures contracts. The 
differences suggested the best basis is given by the previous year’s ratio of state prices for corn, 
by the five previous years’ average of the ratio of state prices for soybeans, and by no correction 
for wheat. Since there is no futures market for sorghum, expected sorghum prices are calculated 
by multiplying the average monthly price at planting time by the five year average of the ratio 
between monthly average price at harvest time and the monthly average price at planting time, so 






, , , 5
1
s s t planting sorg
s t harvest sorg
t planting sorg t sorg P
P
P EP . Because under 
the  1996  Farm  Bill,  corn,  sorghum,  soybean  and  wheat  producers  were  eligible  for  loan 
deficiency payments (defined by the difference between the county loan rate and the posted 
county price when this price was below the loan rate), these payments effectively created a floor 
for the price farmers could receive. Expected crop prices for all four crops were then calculated 
as the maximum of the commodity county loan rate ( ict LoanRate ) and the expected market price 
calculated above,  ( ) t c i t i t i LoanRate EP EP , , , , , max = , i = corn, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat. Note, 
however, that for the years 1996 and 1997 the reference loan rate used was the national rate, not 
the county loan rate. 
During this period, the size of the farms in the KFMA increased, mainly through an 
increase in owned acres. The crop mix also changed, with corn and soybeans acres increasing 
while  wheat  and  sorghum  acres  decreased.  At  the  same  time,  decoupled  payments  receipts 20 
increased  by  about  1.6  times.  Table  1  contains  the  variable  definitions  and  some  summary 
statistics. 
4.2.  Empirical Results  
Our empirical analysis is conducted in three segments, as we explore how AMTA payments 
affect  the farmers’  crop  acreage  decisions  by  analyzing how  they  affected  total  (owned  and 
rented) crop acres, owned crop acres, and the decisions to plant corn, sorghum, soybeans and 
wheat.  
4.2.1.  Total Crop Acres 
Table 2 reports the results of the OLS and FE parameter estimates for the total (owned and 
rented) crop acres LHS variable. We report results for different versions of these estimators, 
which  vary  in  the  dummy  variables  included.  We  estimate  three  versions  of  the  OLS 
specification,  which  appear  in  columns  (1)  through  (3).  Column  (1)  includes  the  results  of 
estimating without dummy variables, column (2) includes year and county dummies, and column 
(3) includes year, county, and year-county interaction dummies. We also estimate two versions 
of the FE estimator, the first including year dummies, in column (4), and the second including 
year and year-county interaction dummies, in column (5).   
Controlling for time-invariant effects has a major impact on the magnitude of most of the 
coefficients. The debt to asset coefficient actually changes sign, becoming significantly negative 
in  the  FE  estimators,  thereby  conforming  to  the  expected  sign.  AMTA  payments  do  affect 
acreage  decisions,  but  less  so  in  the  FE  estimators.  Not  acknowledging  the  presence  of 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity suggests a $1,000 transfer in AMTA payments raises 21 
crop acres from about 20 to 23 acres. This estimate decreases to a 4 to 5 acre increase when we 
move  to  the  FE  estimator.  These  coefficients  imply  elasticities  (without  incorporating  the 
interaction  term)  ranging  from  0.055  and  0.366  in  the  FE  specification  with  year  dummy 
variables and the OLS specification without dummy variables. When we take into consideration 
the  possibility  of  events  which  affect  particular  counties  in  particular  years,  the  elasticities 
increase  to  0.074  in  the  FE  estimator  and  decrease  to  0.318  in  the  OLS  estimator.  These 
payments, however, do not seem to have a differential effect on farmers who are more credit 
constrained,  as the  interaction term is never  significant.  The  total  acres  elasticity of  AMTA 
payments considering the interaction term is very similar, varying between 0.320 and 0.362 for 
the  OLS  estimators  with  year  and  county  dummy  variables  and  without  dummy  variables, 
respectively,  and  between  0.068  and  0.082  for  the  FE  estimator  without  and  with  dummy 
variables. 
4.2.2.  Owned Acres 
Empirical  work  suggests  that  given  the  importance  of  the  rental  market  for  land,  the  most 
important effect of AMTA payments was to increase the value of the principal fixed asset in 
agriculture, land. For farmers who wanted to expand crop acres, this may have motivated the 
purchase  of  additional  land,  instead  of  renting.  Goodwin  and  Mishra’s  (2006)  results,  for 
example,  suggested  AMTA  payments  could  lead  to  more  ownership  transactions.  We  now 
investigate whether AMTA payments explain the variation in owned planted acres, and maintain 
our  additional  hypothesis  that  payments  matter  the  more  highly  leveraged  the  farmer.  Our 
estimating equation is identical to equation (5), but our dependent variable is now owned crop 
acres instead of total (owned and rented) crop acres.  22 
Table 3 presents the results. These share some  features of those of total (owned and 
rented) crop acres, although they differ in three ways. First, the debt to asset ratio has a positive 
coefficient across the estimators and their different specifications, although it is not significant 
except for the FE estimator using year dummy variables. This result suggests that the degree to 
which farms are credit-constrained does not affect the farmers’ owned crop acres, while at the 
same time questions the extent to which leverage is endogenous to acreage, as farmers may be 
borrowing to finance more production in owned land.  
Second, the coefficient estimates for AMTA payments change signs between estimators, 
being positive and significant in the OLS estimators and negative and insignificant in the FE 
estimators.  The  owned  acres  elasticity  of  AMTA  payments  without  the  interaction  term  is 
somewhat lower than in the total acres equation, varying between 0.097 and 0.139 for the two 
OLS  estimators  with  and  without  dummy  variables.  Finally,  and  most  importantly,  the 
interaction term between AMTA payments and the debt to asset ratio is positive and significant 
across  the  three  estimators  and  their  different  specifications.  These  positive  significant 
coefficients on the interaction term suggest that AMTA payments boost the purchase of crop 
acres  for  more  highly  leveraged  farmers.  The  owned  acres  elasticity  of  AMTA  payments 
considering the interaction term is now between 0.250 and 0.257 for the OLS estimators with 
year  and  county  dummy  variables  and  without  dummy  variables,  respectively,  and  between 
0.0003 and 0.028 for the  FE estimator with and without the  year-county interactions. These 
elasticities are much lower than those found for the total crop acres case since AMTA payments 
do not appear to have a direct impact on own acres. Our results suggest their biggest impact is on 
the  more  highly  leveraged  farmer,  supporting  our  second  hypothesis  that  AMTA  payments 
matter  more for  the  more  leveraged farmers.  It  is  possible  that these  payments improve  the 23 
collateral of the more credit constrained farmers, allowing them to purchase land. This additional 
land also serves as collateral, one whose value increases due to the distribution of decoupled 
payments, as suggested in previous work. 
4.2.3.  Crop specific equations 
So far our analysis has considered the global impact of AMTA payments on planted acres, and 
has ignored potential effects upon the farmers’ choice of crop mix. Our goal in this section is to 
observe  how  decoupled  payments  affect  the planted acreage  of  specific  crops,  namely  corn, 
sorghum, soybeans, and wheat. Over the duration of the FAIR Act, the average farm in our 
sample increased its planted acres of corn and soybeans, both by about 40 percent, while acres 
planted to sorghum and wheat decreased by 12 and 6 percent, respectively.  
The framework for evaluating the effect of decoupled payments on the planted acreage of 
corn, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat is the one presented before. Acreage is still a function of 
farm characteristics, financial variables, and government payments. However, we now include 
expected prices in the estimation and drop the use of year dummy variables. For each crop the 
basic estimating equation is given by: 
(7) 
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where the acres planted of the jth crop ( jict Acres ) are a function of expected prices of the crop 
( jict EPrice ) and the alternative crops ( kict EPrice , k = 1, 2, 3) , and the farm characteristics, 
financial  variables,  and  government  payment  variables  defined  earlier.  The  coefficients  of 
interest are now  5 β , the marginal acreage effect of AMTA payments, and  6 β , the impact of 24 
leverage  on  the  marginal  effect  of  AMTA  payments.  As  before,  we  expect  to  find  positive 
coefficients on these regressors, indicating the presence of wealth effects from AMTA payments, 
and how their effect depends on the degree to which farms are constrained by credit. We again 
estimate the commodity equations using OLS and FE.  
Table 4 contains the parameter estimates and summary statistics of the estimation. The 
own  price  effects  are  negative  for  corn  in  both  estimators  and  for  sorghum  using  the  FE 
estimator. These effects are positive for soybeans and wheat, and significantly so for the latter 
crop. Except for soybeans, where changing estimators changes the sign of the coefficient, and 
following what happened with total crop acres and owned acres, the direct effect of AMTA 
payments  decreases  when  we  take  into  account  unobserved  time-invariant  factors.  The 
coefficient remains positive and significant  for corn but loses significance for sorghum,  and 
actually  becomes  negative  for  wheat,  where  AMTA  payments  go  from  having  a  very  large 
impact to a negligible one. These effects are, however, very small. In the FE estimator, a $1,000 
transfer in AMTA payments increases corn and soybeans by about 1.3 acres. The associated 
elasticities range from 0.4182 to 0.6282 for corn and wheat in the OLS estimator, and 0.1173 and 
0.1582 for soybeans and corn in the FE estimator. These values are much greater than those of 
Goodwin  and  Mishra  (2006),  who  reported  an  elasticity  of  0.0317  for  corn  and  0.0204  for 
soybeans (and a positive elasticity of 0.0428 for wheat). These elasticities are also much greater 
than those from the total crop acres estimation using the same FE estimator. Meanwhile, any 
effects of leverage appear to be absorbed by the farm-specific fixed effects. In the FE model, the 
positive significance for corn and negative significance for wheat disappears. The full AMTA 
payments elasticities of specific crops acres now range from 0.1624 for soybeans and 0.1824 for 
corn.  25 
Finally, notice that our finding that AMTA payments matter for corn and soybeans is 
consistent with the observed increases in corn and soybeans acres, and decreases in sorghum and 
wheat acres. When we account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, AMTA payments 
had significant positive acreage effects for those commodities whose planted acres increased 
over the period of the FAIR Act, corn and soybeans, and negligible effects for those whose 
planted acres decreased, sorghum and wheat.   
5.  Concluding comments 
According to the U.S. General Accounting Office, during the first four fiscal years of the Farm 
Security  and  Rural  Investment  Act  of  2002,  farmers  received  approximately  $60  billion  in 
federal  program  payments  from  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture  (USDA).  Due  to 
unexpectedly weak commodity prices, the 2002 Farm Bill, originally  expected to cost about 
$170 billion over the following 10 years, pushed the total price tag to $190 billion. These rising 
costs have significant effects at the national and international levels. At the national level, higher 
costs increase budgetary pressure. This effect is magnified by increases in production induced by 
payments. That is, if support payments stimulate production, prices decrease, requiring an even 
greater level of support in order to maintain the desired level of farm income. A second issue is 
that heterogeneity within the farm sector results in an unbalanced distribution of payments, so 
that most of the transfers do not reach small farms. In 2004, the largest 7.5 percent of farms in 
terms of gross receipts received 56 percent of all government payments (USDA). Hence, the 
improvement  in  family  farm  income,  the  stated  goal  of  these  policies,  is  not  met,  creating 
additional discontent with the policy. A commonly-cited perverse outcome is that recipients of 
Farm Bill payments include, among others, TV host David Letterman  and former NBA star 26 
Scottie Pippen, neither of whom need the additional income, presumably.
6 There may also be 
environmental  consequences  or  other  externalities  if  the  payments  affect  crop  production 
decisions. At the international level, increased spending on agricultural support payments does 
not  seem  compatible  with  the  multilateral  commitments  made  under  the  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO) to limit trade-distorting agricultural support. This has been highlighted by 
recent trade  disputes  in  the  WTO.  For example, in  September  of  2002,  at  a meeting  of the 
Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, Brazil claimed that U.S. cotton subsidies were depressing 
world  prices  and  injuring Brazilian  growers.  A  similar  claim  was  made  about  the  European 
Union’s sugar subsidies. Two years later the WTO panel decided in favor of Brazil, deeming 
U.S. support to cotton producers as trade-distorting. A similar decision was reached for sugar. 
The  literature  has  identified  several  possible  coupling  mechanisms  of  decoupled 
payments. Decoupled payments may affect production through, for example, wealth effects and 
their impact on farmers’ risk aversion or labor choices, expectations about future revisions of 
policy, or credit constraints. The overall consensus, however, is that with the exception of land 
values, decoupled payments’ effects, when measurable, are small. Our goal was to revisit the 
impact of decoupled payments in the presence of credit constraints. The idea is that decoupled 
payments  may  be  used  to  replace  or  complement  outside  credit  in  undertaking  investment 
projects thereby distorting production. Our hypotheses were that AMTA payments had a direct 
impact on crop acres and that these payments mattered more for more highly leveraged farmers.  
Like previous studies, we find that the production effects are small. Nonetheless, they 
suggest decoupled payments have potentially distortionary effects on production. When we take 
                                                 
6 According to the Environmental Working Group database of farm payments beneficiaries, subsidy benefits for 
Scottie  Pippen  and  David  Letterman  totaled  $78,945  and  $8,023  respectively  for  2003-2005  Program  Years 
(http://farm.ewg.org/).  27 
into account time-invariant heterogeneity, when AMTA payments increase by $1,000, total crop 
acres increase by 3.5 to 4.7 acres, suggesting an elasticity of 0.055 to 0.074. And while owned 
crop acres do not seem to respond directly to these payments, they matter for the more leveraged 
farmer.  For the individual crops whose acreage increased over the period, AMTA payments 
matter for soybeans and corn, with $1,000 of AMTA payments increasing acres of these crops by 
about 1.3 acres, implying greater elasticities than those from the total crop acres estimation using 
the same FE estimator. These payments did not matter for sorghum and wheat, the crops whose 
planted acres decreased over the period of the FAIR Act. 
The analysis was performed using observations on KFMA farms over the period of the 
FAIR Act, which allowed us to overcome a major limitation in previous studies of the effects of 
decoupled payments on farmers’ acreage decisions, as we were able to observe individual farms 
over time. We did not, however, have access to these farms’ receipts of AMTA payments, and 
had to estimate these values given the farmers’ acres in the late eighties. It is possible that over 
this period farmers bought or sold base acres, thereby changing their transfers. Further research 
would benefit from a more complete set of data. In addition, potential dynamic issues that we 
may have ignored remain an area for future research.  28 
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Tables 
Table 1. Variable definition and summary statistics 
Variable Definition Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Wealtht-1 Wealth ($1,000) 6,796 1,129.93 847.14
DARt Debt to asset ratio 6,796 0.1682 0.1566
AMTAt  AMTA payments (PFC+MLA) ($1,000) 6,796 17.95 16.34
Sizet-1  Total Operated Acres 6,796 1,788.49 1,342.08
Acrest Total Crop Acres 6,796 1,149.27 871.53
Acres_Ot Owned Crop Acres 6,796 401.16 446.04
Acres_Cornt Acres of Corn 6,796 148.73 248.10
Acres_Sorghumt Acres of Sorghum 6,796 178.06 238.72
Acres_Soybeanst Acres of Soybeans 6,796 208.75 317.85
Acres_Wheatt Acres of Wheat 6,796 381.01 408.61
EPcorn,t Expected Corn Price ($/bu) 6,796 2.81 0.65
EPsorghum,t Expected Sorghum Price ($/bu) 6,796 6.09 0.92
EPsoybeans,t Expected SoybeansPrice ($/bu) 6,796 3.97 0.54
EPwheat,t Expected Wheat Price ($/bu) 6,796 2.70 0.53
 31 
Table 2. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for total (owned and rented) crop acres 
Crop Acres (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Farm size (acres) 0.209* 0.156* 0.158* 0.027 0.030
(0.021) (0.02) (0.02) (0.032) (0.032)
Wealth (1,000) 0.227* 0.311* 0.306* 0.090* 0.084*
(0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.03)
Debt to asset ratio (DAR) 292.568* 260.472* 290.979* -376.678* -360.048*
(60.386) (55.103) (56.866) (97.648) (101.613)
AMTA payments ($1,000) 23.446* 19.781* 20.369* 3.510** 4.710*
(1.494) (1.339) (1.402) (1.561) (1.57)
Interaction term: DAR and AMTA -1.545 4.194 3.799 4.900 3.074
(3.809) (3.378) (3.469) (6.457) (6.803)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
County dummies  No Yes Yes - -
Year - County dummies No No Yes No Yes
N 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289
R2  0.6799 0.7661 0.782 0.9572 0.9652
OLS FE
 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 3. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for owned crop acres 
Owned Crop Acres (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Farm size (acres) 0.065* 0.016 0.016 -0.016 -0.008
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.024) (0.019)
Wealth (1,000) 0.070* 0.132* 0.134* -0.008 -0.011
(0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.018) (0.015)
Debt to asset ratio (DAR) 46.397 30.361 22.883 119.250* 74.384
(54.173) (53.311) (56.728) (55.528) (66.351)
AMTA payments ($1,000) 3.108* 2.242* 2.178** -0.428 -1.082
(0.968) (0.887) (0.956) (1.06) (1.067)
Interaction term: DAR and AMTA 15.707* 19.927* 20.716* 6.219*** 6.472***
(3.564) (3.517) (3.743) (3.24) (3.544)
Year dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes
County dummies  No Yes Yes - -
Year - County dummies No No Yes No Yes
N 5289 5289 5289 5289 5289
R
2  0.2177 0.3804 0.4112 0.9122 0.9352
OLS FE
 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 33 
Table 4. Parameter estimates and summary statistics for specific crops’ acres 
Variable Corn Sorghum Soybeans Wheat  Corn Sorghum Soybeans Wheat 
Farm size (acres) -0.041* 0.006 -0.039* 0.115* 0.012 -0.017 -0.005 0.021
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.017) (0.006) (0.02)
Expected Corn Price ($/bu) -73.743 -72.732 -94.256 -61.769 -34.539*** -27.898 -30.334 34.375
(63.666) (64.365) (86.972) (99.545) (20.164) (24.214) (20.501) (24.072)
Expected Sorghum Price ($/bu) -86.638** 43.548 347.524* -291.614* -39.115** -45.639** 12.461 -52.880**
(38.249) (34.058) (47.137) (54.225) (19.994) (20.363) (13.875) (25.508)
Expected SoybeansPrice ($/bu) -61.567 156.896* 605.873* -312.990* -52.739 -51.857*** 17.113 -74.608***
(63.18) (57.138) (77.826) (88.802) (32.239) (27.733) (23.549) (41.77)
Expected Wheat Price ($/bu) 105.055 -110.957***-604.396* 418.986* 58.237*** 82.388** -11.822 93.893**
(68.736) (64.152) (87.048) (99.089) (35.108) (33.918) (24.818) (44.739)
Wealth (1,000) 0.157* 0.038* 0.241* -0.080* 0.023* 0.019 0.024** 0.013
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.019) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015)
Debt to asset ratio (DAR) 122.070* 26.484 283.506* -37.076 -7.769 -104.034* 9.658 -154.230*
(25.057) (38.954) (32.342) (41.309) (30.525) (39.688) (26.52) (52.97)
AMTA payments ($1,000) 3.465* 5.165* -1.085*** 13.335* 1.311** 0.448 1.365* -0.953
(0.518) (0.635) (0.621) (0.845) (0.519) (0.85) (0.405) (0.741)
Interaction term: DAR and AMTA 7.640* -1.139 1.775 -7.476* 1.193 0.327 -0.111 3.707
(1.776) (2.643) (1.701) (2.806) (1.631) (1.654) (0.965) (2.547)
N 5,289 5,289 5,289 5,289 5,289 5,289 5,289 5,289
R
2  0.3565 0.2071 0.2617 0.4087 0.9085 0.7402 0.9342 0.9305
OLS FE
 
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 